The search for agreement on acid rain policy
In 1990, Britain's power plants and industrial boilers emitted 1,436 thousand tones of sulphur dioxide, of which 477 thousand tones fell as acid rain in Britain, and the rest fell on neighboring countries on the sea or is unidentified; and 543 thousand tones, emitted by its neighbors, fell on Britain [See EMEP, (6) ]. In 1994, a £700m (US $1050m) enhancement of a single British power station (Drax) became operative, as part of a £8 billion programme with the objective of significantly reducing SO 2 emissions by the year 2000. In this paper we examine how much each country in Europe should spend for this purpose and in particular how much should be spent on cleaning up dirty emissions.
The damage caused by Britain's emissions was borne both by the people of Britain and the other countries, each of which also spread SO 2 on itself and its neighbors. This is a classic instance of economic inefficiency, since policies to reduce emissions -abatement policies -will be operated at less than optimal levels because countries and, more narrowly, power generating companies, do not bear the full costs of the damage they themselves cause. Economic theory can predict the "rational" level of abatement under a variety of assumptions, ranging from complete non-cooperation, through bargaining in the absence of sanctions or transfers, to the utopian cases of fully cooperative optimization at the regional or even world level.
The recognition of these problems has led to political action in many countries on emission standards and other regulations. The transboundary nature of the problem and the need for international coordinated policy measures have been recognized by the 1979 Convention on LongRange Transboundary Air Pollution, which was signed by 32 European countries (and the EEC), the USA and Canada. In 1985 a Protocol was added to the Convention committing signatories to reduce sulphur emissions by at least 30% by 1993 as compared with their 1980 emission levels (the "30% Club"). And in 1994, a "New Protocol" has been announced which modifies the 30% Club targets in a manner intended to yield a more equitable distribution of the burden of abatement (Klaasen [14] ). Figure 1 shows the substantial nature of these revisions: note that negative 30% Club targets mean that by 1990 the original 30% target had already been over-fulfilled. Uniform percentage reductions in emissions by each country are potentially inefficient for a number of reasons: (1) the characteristics of emitting sources vary from country to country, so that emissions control opportunities and costs vary between countries; (2) environmental objectives are not explicitly taken into account in setting emissions reduction goalsthese objectives may vary spatially because ecosystems are not uniformly assimilative of SO 2 and NO x ; (3) SO 2 and NO x are non-uniformly mixing pollutants, i.e. the spatial pattern of depositions varies with the locational pattern of sources; (4) evaluation of damage caused by depositions varies across countries.
In discussing emission reduction, it is necessary to make a distinction between primary and secondary abatement. By primary abatement, we mean the reduction of sulphur emissions by such means as: switching to low-or sulphur-free fuel; reduced use of sulphurous fuel as a result of improved fuel efficiency in power stations; improved energy-efficiency in the rest of the economy; or any other measure reducing the output of electricity. Secondary abatement involves the removal of sulphur from emissions during (e.g. by Fluidised Bed Combustion) or after (e.g. by Flue Gas Desulphurisation) burning the fuel, or removal (e.g. by washing) of sulphur before burning. The targets of the New Protocol and the 30% Club do not specify which means should be adopted. In this paper we are primarily concerned with the optimal pattern of secondary abatement, whose potential contribution to the targets can then be assessed and the role of primary abatement thus exposed. The choice between primary and secondary abatement has recently been discussed in detail by Newbery [18] , and may involve, for example, the choice between using locally mined high calorific but sulphurous coal, combined with retrofitted abatement equipment as in the Drax case cited, and building new gas-burning power stations.
Mäler [16] and Halkos [8] have shown that for the costs of implementing the 30% Club target by secondary abatement, a 40% reduction in total emissions by allocating abatement expenditure to equalize marginal costs across the countries of Europe is possible. This "costeffectiveness" approach, however, runs into the same problems as the 30% Club in securing agreement and implementation, since the net benefits are unequally distributed, and could be negative for some countries like Britain where reduced depositions may be valued less than their increased abatement costs. Nevertheless, the fact of the 30% Club Agreement points to the possibility of a more efficient agreement, which should be seen in the context of a wider set of issues on which countries seek agreement. These other issues include trade policy, fisheries, river and coastal pollution, military expenditure and foreign aid; for example, recent discussions within GATT have included the possibility of trade sanctions against countries with low abatement expenditure on the grounds of "unfair competition" (see [21] ). These countries may agree to cooperate to their own disadvantage over a single issue, so long as this helps achieve advantageous agreement over other issues. In turn, such multi-issue agreements may provide countries with the means to punish deviation by others by in turn deviating from individually disadvantageous agreements.
In this paper we distinguish between two types of cooperative agreement. The "social welfare" (henceforth SW) agreement can be viewed as an efficient version of the 30% Club, in that it seeks to achieve maximum aggregate net benefits, although these may be distributed unevenly and even yield negative net benefits for some countries. In this latter event, "side-payments" to induce agreement are needed: such side-payments may not be financial, but could be in the form of compensating net benefits from agreement on other issues. The complexity of such multinational/multi-issue bargaining need hardly be emphasized, however, which serves to demonstrate their utopian character (for discussion, see Andersson [4] , Mäler [15, 16] , Newbery [17] and Welsch [25] ). The second type of cooperative agreement we consider is more restrictive, but should be easier to achieve, since it requires that all countries achieve non-negative net benefits:
this is the Pareto-dominant (PD), or "no-loser" solution. An objective of this paper is to quantify the costs of restricting the form of agreement to this second type, thus eliminating the need for sidepayments or collateral agreements.
The benchmark against which to judge the benefits of cooperation is, of course, the status quo, which we take to be the "naive" non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, in which each country takes the policies of its neighbors as given, optimizing within that context. The general principles of game theory in this sort of context are set out in [11] , but there have been few empirical applications so far reported. Mäler [15] provides a clear analysis of the "acid rain game" and some estimates of the gains from cooperation for European countries; Kaitala et al. [13] and Tahvonen et al. [20] model a dynamic game between Finland and four regions of the former USSR. We take Mäler's study as our point of departure, and based on different data and model specification provide further numerical estimates of the potential benefits from cooperation and the potential role of secondary abatement in particular.
The essential steps in this form of study are as follows. First, for each country, one must determine abatement cost functions: these measure the cost of eliminating tones of SO 2 from power stations' emissions, and will vary between countries depending on the existing power generation technology, and on the local costs of implementing best practice abatement techniques. Full details of the abatement cost functions used here are reported in [7, 9] and summarized below in section 1.
These control functions are based on research conducted by the Stockholm Environment Institute at York (SEIY) using information at the level of the individual power station; the International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA, Austria) estimates are based on more aggregate data.
The IIASA functions are the basis of Mäler 's study, while Kaitala et al. [13] and Tahvonen et al. Third, damage functions are necessary. The existing applied literature assumes that damage is a linear function of deposition (see [15, 16] ). The evidence of sensitivity maps (see [1, 5] ), however, strongly indicates that this is not valid, and that the damage function should be convex: depending on the local ecology, a succession of thresholds of tolerance to acidity results in increases in the marginal damage as the level of acidity increases. Thus doubling the rate of deposition will more than double the damage caused. In common with other studies, we do not directly estimate the damage functions, but infer their parameters by assuming that countries currently equate national marginal damage cost with national marginal abatement cost, the latter being obtained from the cost functions described above. The assumed form of the damage function has quite far-reaching implications for the analysis, as we shall show.
Modeling optimal abatement
We begin by defining the net benefit function for each country i as
where AC i is abatement cost and DC i is damage cost. The abatement cost function is
where SR i is tones of sulphur removed from sulphur emissions E i : net emissions from country i are therefore given by the difference E i -SR i . These emissions are the byproduct of power generation and other uses of fuel, which we take as exogenous. We later use empirical estimates of the AC i functions: these functions are convex, with AC i ' > 0 and AC i '' > 0  i.
The damage cost function depends on sulphur deposits, and is also country-specific:
where D i is tones of sulphur deposited in country i, and with DC i ' > 0. It is often assumed for empirical purposes that the damage function is linear (see e.g. Mäler [15, 16] and Newbery [17] ), while theoretical work assumes convexity i.e. DC i '' > 0 (see e.g. Welsch (op. cit.)). We will use the convex assumption both for realism and because it permits policy interdependence, as discussed below.
Deposits of sulphur in each country depend on the international transfer matrix H, where h ij is the proportion of net emissions from country j which are deposited in i: these proportions are assumed fixed. Country i also receives D iB , other background deposits (from the rest of the world, volcanos, etc). Thus
The damage function is therefore also convex in SR, and the net benefit function NB i concave in
The status quo is modeled as the laissez-faire case of multilateral Nash equilibrium, with SR as the choice variable. The i'th country maximizes NB i by choosing SR i to set marginal private net benefit to zero:
giving the reaction function discussed further below.
In the SW maximization case, aggregate net benefit is maximized when each country sets marginal social net benefit to zero:
Since AC j /SR i = 0  ij, marginal social net benefit is given by
hence the optimum is achieved by equating the individual marginal abatement cost to the aggregate marginal benefit. Since marginal benefits are non-negative and marginal abatement costs increasing, it is clear that abatement is higher under SW maximization. This is illustrated in the demand and supply diagram in Figure 2 below, in which marginal benefit (MB) is the negative of marginal damage cost, NSR is "Nash sulphur removed" and SWSR is "SW sulphur removed": with a linear damage function yielding constant marginal benefit (MB(L)), the SW outcome (SWSR (L)) is shown to be greater than that with diminishing marginal benefit.
An increase in sulphur emissions in the rest of the world would shift the sloping MB lines to the right, resulting in more domestic abatement, while the horizontal MB(L) lines would not be affected: this illustrates how nonlinear damage functions are necessary to generate interdependent abatement policy. Strict equalities in the above argument imply the assumptions that in the status quo all countries choose to incur some abatement cost (SR i > 0) and that the feasible upper limit of abatement is less than 100%, so that AC  as SR  E: an interior solution follows. Welsch (op.
cit.) discusses the possibility that the non-negativity constraint binds at the optimum, but dismisses that case as a practical problem.
Welsch establishes that the conditions for a SW equilibrium to exist are quite favorable, provided agreement on monitoring and on the measurement of abatement and damage costs can first be reached. In such equilibrium cost-sharing would be essential since side-payments would be required to ensure that no country is a net loser relative to the Nash status quo. As pointed out above, these side-payments might take the form of commitments on other issues also requiring multilateral agreement.
We wish to consider the case, however, where side-payments are ruled out: the reason for this is that the conditions for a SW equilibrium may be considered impossibly utopian, particularly since the damage costs of acid rain are highly uncertain and contentious (see [3, 17, 19, 22, 23] ).
A more reasonable objective is an agreement under which each country achieves at least the Nash benefit level, without having to agree levels of monetary compensation with all its neighbors to offset abatement and damage costs. Monitoring would still be necessary to ensure physical emission limits were not exceeded, but this is relatively easy to establish. Such equilibrium is the Pareto-dominant or "no-loser" case given by:
where NB i * is the initial Nash benefit level, and SR = {SR 1 , SR 2 ,....SR i ,....} the set of abatement levels. The aggregate benefits achieved in this case will be less than in the SW case, and it is of interest to measure the potential gains relative to the polar Nash and SW cases. We report our estimates below.
The bilateral case
Bilateral analysis allows a simple graphical representation of the different equilibrium concepts and the importance of nonlinear damage function. Solution of the bilateral case will permit empirical comparison of partial cooperative gains with fully multilateral SW gains.
Graphically, the different equilibrium outcomes are shown in In this case, with negatively sloped reaction functions, the Von Stackelberg solution is another non-cooperative case that may be obtained from the problem:
The empirical study of European abatement

Measurement and approximation of abatement cost functions
The basic idea behind the derivation of cost functions is to find the least-cost abatement technologies for each country for any given level of sulphur abatement. We here provide a brief account of the necessary procedures and assumptions For every European country and for every plant in every sector an abatement cost curve may be derived which shows the least cost emission control function for each source. This means that for a country with n power plants, industrial boilers and petroleum refineries there would be n abatement cost curves. To produce a least cost curve for a country these curves are aggregated. This is done by finding the technology on the plant with the lowest marginal cost per tone of sulphur removed in the country and the amount of sulphur removed by that technology on that plant. This is the first step on the country curve. Iteratively the next highest marginal cost is found and is added to the country curve with the amount of sulphur removed on the X-axis. In the final national cost curve each step represents an abatement measure that achieves an emission reduction of an extra unit at the least cost. The national cost curve consists of a large number of very small steps. It should be noted that in a decentralised economy, the achievement of such minima may be prevented by the existence of taxes or by various forms of market failure, and intervention may be required to induce the private sector to minimize real resource costs.
For analytical purposes, it is necessary to approximate the national cost curves by a functional form, at least over a relevant range spanning the range between current abatement levels and those implied by the international agreements. We found that least squares equations of the 
Damage cost function and its approximation
The problem of estimating benefit functions (or equivalently damage functions) is more difficult than the estimation of abatement costs, since the consequences of acidification cannot be identified with any certainty. Damage depends on deposits, which depend on the [h ij ] matrix as shown above. This matrix is measured using the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP) transfer coefficient matrix, a basic instrument in all empirical models dealing with acid-rain problems [6] .
As already pointed out, the choice of restrictions on the derivatives of DC i (.) is important.
Mäler [15, 16] and Newbery [17] , although stating a preference for a convex damage function, assume a linear damage function with DC i ' constant for all i, but we have chosen an alternative 1 For more details on abatement cost function derivation, see Halkos [7, 8, 9] and Appendix III. 2 Equations were fitted across the range 5-55% of maximum feasible abatement; constraining a 1i to zero helped avoid negative abatement solutions. See Appendix II charts illustrating typical maximum feasible abatement. It follows easily that total cost is minimized when
This is the only information available to "calibrate" the damage function, on the assumption that national authorities act as Nash partners in a non-cooperative game with the rest of the world, taking as given deposits originating in the rest of the world. If, like Mäler [15, 16] Comparing (i) and (ii), this choice obviously halves the implied total damage costs at the optimum; the positive second derivative means that the benefits from reductions in deposits will also be less than implied by a linear damage function, while the costs of additional deposits will be greater.
The quadratic damage function also yields interdependence of policies, as discussed for the bilateral case above.
This "revealed preference" calibration procedure rests on strong assumptions: in each country it is assumed that abatement policy has been optimized so that marginal abatement cost equals marginal damage cost, the latter being somehow evaluated according to local conditions and attitudes. Such evaluations will depend as much on political and social considerations as on objective measures of physical damage. In this paper the importance of political change in Germany for damage function calibration is accordingly recognized.
The results of this paper depend on EMEP data, based on the old European boundaries. It is useful to work with this 'old data'. It does not make much sense to aggregate FRG and GDR simply for the sake of using current boundaries for the reason that policies in the two areas have historically been so different. In our model, we have used different damage coefficients for FRG and GDR for the year 1990 and the FRG's damage coefficient for both countries for the year 2000 in an attempt to model their political union. Similarly, the political evolution in the old USSR and
Czechoslovakia is a political issue: as our calibration is based on the year 1990 it is necessary to treat these areas as political units even in 2000. 
Numerical Results
The discussion below is largely in terms of graphs: the numerical details may be found in Table A1 . case, but in terms of tones of sulphur, the difference is proportionately much greater. The aggregate gain from full cooperation is, however, only about 2% of total costs, although average abatement rises from 5% to 11%. The balance of total costs shifts from the damage to the abatement component.
i. Initial vs SW Solutions for 1990
Figure 5:
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iii. Bilateral examples
The table below illustrates the difference between full multilateral and bilateral cooperation.
The case of FRG and GDR is interesting because of their political union: the results show that GDR loses in each case, but the multilateral loss (relative to Nash) is much greater; by contrast, FRG's multilateral gains are much greater than bilateral gains. Thus both gain from the extra abatement of their neighbors, while GDR also incurs significantly greater abatement costs in the multilateral case. Bilateral negotiation between UK and FRG, however, yield trivial gains in total, FRG being the gainer; but even in the multilateral case, the UK is much less affected than FRG.
The reason is that the UK gains little from others' abatement, while its relatively high marginal cost of abatement prevents a large absolute increase in abatement (although the abatement rate increases sharply proportionately). The third pair, Austria and Italy, shows a small gain from bilateral cooperation, but both lose from higher abatement costs under multilateral cooperation: the significance of this example is that such a pair might easily negotiate a bilateral agreement but would require generous side-payments from a multilateral agreement, intrinsically more difficult to negotiate. For these three pairs, the Stackelberg solutions are very close to the Nash solutions, and are therefore not reported separately: this demonstrates the small degree of policy interdependence in the bilateral case, since an individual neighbor has much less effect than the collection of all neighbors. 
iv. Primary vs secondary abatement in 2000 and the New Protocol
To infer the contributions of primary and secondary abatement to the New Protocol targets, we compare the target abatement rates with SW optimal secondary rates. Target less SW optimal secondary provides an estimate of the required primary contribution, in the form of an abatement deficit. This estimate will be biased downward; however, since the SW rates are computed for IIASA gross emission projections for 2000: high levels of primary abatement, such as fuelswitching, would reduce gross emissions, resulting in lower secondary abatement rates in our model.
The residual role for primary abatement is nevertheless very high. Figure 7 shows that primary abatement must contribute more than 80% of total abatement, and that for most countries major primary programs will be required. Turkey, Switzerland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Greece and Albania appear to be the only countries with relatively modest primary abatement requirements; the feasibility of the targets for the rest of Europe must be in question.
There are technical, political and economic obstacles to high levels of primary abatement.
Among the technical issues are the low calorific value and the ash characteristics of low sulphur coal affecting the operation of electrostatic precipitators. Politically, there are many problems such as resistance to the substitution of imports for domestic fuel, environmental concerns surrounding nuclear power and employment effects in coal-mining communities. Finally, in Eastern Europe, where many of the greatest changes are required and serious economic problems have arisen, retrofitting of secondary abatement equipment to old generators may be impracticable, and the costs would amount to 1-2% of GDP compared with no more than 0.4 % for all Europe. It may be necessary that Western Europe provides some form of aid to ensure achievement of agreed targets. 
Summary and Conclusions
i.
The "30% Club" sulphur abatement targets for 2000 have recently been substantially revised, mainly upward, and will require major programs of fuel switching or other methods to reduce consumption of sulphur fuels.
ii. Fully cooperative secondary abatement policy would reduce total abatement plus damage costs for 2000 by about 2%, and would result in a 6% reduction in sulphur deposits. In the absence of any mechanism to assess and ensure side-payments, maximum cost savings are Note: initabate=initial % abatement rate; sw1990, sw2000 = SW % rates for 1990, 2000; nash2000= nash % rate for 2000; pareto2000= PD % rate for 2000; swtc = SW total costs for 2000; swgains, pgains = Nash total cost less swtc and PD total costs; np2000 = New Protocol % rate for 2000; 30%2000 = 30% Cluc % rate for 2000.
I
II Abatement cost curve comparisons
The marginal cost curves for the 27 European countries in the year 2000 presented in Halkos [7, 9] can be divided into two main groups of countries: those for which new cost values are always higher than IIASA's (e.g. Greece, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, France, FRG, Portugal, U.K.) and those which present a "mixed" evidence, i.e. for some portions of the curves IIASA is more expensive, or vice-versa (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey). As a representative example of each case the marginal abatement cost curves for the UK and Austria follow.
III Current levels of abatement
The cost curves derived in our model represent a "hypothetical" situation, as far as they assume that countries apply a number of technologies for each fuel used and in the most cost-effective way. However, the reality is different. In this section, the current level of abatement (if any) in each European country is presented in Table A2 . Table A3 presents the number of control units installed in each European country (if there are any) at the end of 1989. The first column represents the number of units that are retrofitted and their total capacity (in MWe), the second column gives the same information but for new installations and the third column gives the totals (i.e. number of retrofitted and new units and their total capacity). 
